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THE "TRUST

FUND

THEORY " OF THE CAPITAL STOCK

OF A

CORPORATION.

IT is a matter of no small interest to trace a wellsettled legal doctrine to the case in which it is said to have
been first enunciated, with a view to discovering whether or
not the germs of the doctrine are really to be found there.
Such an investigation is peculiarly interesting in the case
of the American doctrine that the capital stock of a corporation is a "trust fund" for the payment of its debts. Wood v.
Dummer,' is said to be the first case in which the term
"trust ffind" was used in this connection. Inithe opinion
of Mr. Justice STORY, in that case, occurs the following passage : "It appears to me to be very clear on general principles, as well as the legislative intention, that the capital
stock of banks is to be deemed a pledge or trust fund
for the payment of the debts contracted by the bank."
The decision was merely that a court of equity would not
sanction a gratuitous distribution of the capital stock of a
corporation among the shareholders when the balance
retained was insufficient to meet the claims of bill holders.
Forty-nine years later, in Sawyer v. Hoag, we find the
Supreme Court of the United States declaring, per Mr. Justice MILLER: "Though it be a doctrine of modern date,
we think it now well established that the capital stock of a
corporation, especial/y i/s unpaid subscrifitions, is a trust

fund for the benefit of
tion." In that case
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stock, and that the remaining 85 per

EDITORIAL

NOTES.

cent. should be treated as a loan from the corporation to
the stockholder, evidenced by the note of the latter secured
by the deposit of collateral. Upon the insolvency of the
corporation the" assignee demanded payment of the note,
but the stockholder asserted his right to set off a claim
against the company -which he had bought up at 33 per
cent. of its-face value after the insolvency became known.
The Court held (Mr. Justice HUNT dissenting) that the
transaction between the stockholder and the corporation
"was a fraud upon the public, who were expected to deal
with them." It was an attempt to extinguish the stock
debt by converting it into a debt for the loan of money to
the prejudice of creditors. The shareholder, who was a
party to this transaction, and had bought up a claim to
relieve himself from liability, would seem to have been
guilty of such technical "iniquity"

as would deprive him

of the aid of equity to enforce his set-off. But the Court
preferred to say that "the debt which the appellant owed
for his stock was a trust fund devoted to the payment of all
the creditors of the company," and that, as the plaintiff
claimed as an individual, the debts were not mutual or in
the same right. The set-off was-refused on this groufid.
Seven years later, in Hawley v. Upton,' Mr. Chief
Justice WAITE delivering the opinion, the same august
tribunal went so far as to assert that a contract to pay 2o
per cent. for stock was, in law, a contract to pay its par
value, and permitted, the assignee of the corporation to
recover from the defendant the 8o per cent. which he had
not contracted to pay In the following year Mr. Justice
BROWN, now of the Supreme Court of the United States,
then sitting as a district judge, was called upon to decide
a similar question in the case of Flinn v. Bagley,' and he
felt himself compelled to follow the decision in Hawley v.
Upton. In Flinn v. Bagley a corporation, being desirous
of raising money by increasing its capital stock, found itself
confrented by the fact that its existing stock was selling at
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only sixty-six and two-thirds cents oil the dollar. As no
one could be found willing to pay par for what was worth
but sixty-six and two-thirds per cent., there was no recourse
but to issue the new stock at its real value. All the stockholders assented to this arrangement, and it was therefore
no fraud upon them. Nor was it a fraud upon existing
creditors, ' since the assets of the debtor were increased by
the amount of money actually paid in." A subsequent
creditor, however, sought to hold the subscribers to the new
stock liable for the difference between the price paid and
the par value of the stock, although they had received their
shares upon the understanding that the shares were to be
treated as fully paid.
Judge BROWN reviewed the English authorities, especially Currie's Case, Carling's Case, DeRuvigne's Case and
Anderson's Case, and showed that in England the consequence of making a contract to sell shares for less than par
was to avoid the entire transaction, which the Court would
undo and restore the parties to their original position, but
that the court did not conceive itself justified in making a
new contract for the parties and compelling them to perform it. Intimating that he sympathized with this position,
and recognizing the hardship of the case before him, Judge
BROWN used the following language: "I have sought to
find a tenable ground upon which to base a distinction
between this case and the one under consideration, but it
seems to me that there is no substantial difference between
them. Here is an agreement literally to subscribe a certain
sum and to take in payment therefor a certificate, the par
value of which was fixed by law representing a sum onethird larger than the amount of the subscription. How
does this differ from the agreement iri Hawley v. Upton by
which the defendant acknowledged the receipt of ten shares
of stock the par value of which was also fixed by law, and
in consideration thereof promised to pay one-fifth of such
par value?"
Subsequently Judge BROWN was elevated to the
Supreme Court, and in T8 9' was called upon to deliver the
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opinion of that tribunal in the case of Handley v. Stutz.'
In this case there was an increase of capital by the issue of
8oo shares of stock, 300 of which were distributedfiro rala
among stockholders, and the remaining 500 shares were
given as a bonus to those who subscribed to the bonds
of the corporation--it being in evidence that the bonds
could not have been sold had not this additional inducement been offered. In this case, too, a subsequent creditor
sought to hold the distributees of the 300 shares and the
recipients of the bonus liable for the par value of the stock.
But the Court drew a distinction-those who were the distributees of the 300 shares of stock and those who had
taken the 500 shares as a bonus with the bonds-holding
that the former were liable, but that the latter were not.
As to the precise extent of the liability of the former
class the opinion leaves us in some doubt. As is pointed
out in a suggestive note by Mr. THOMAS THACHER in the
American Law Review for October, i891, the court
did not decide with very great clearness whether the
distributees were liable for the par value of the stock or
only for the "fair" value thereof Mr. Justice BRowN,
who had but a short time before bowed unwillingly to
Hawley v. Upton, delivered the opinion of the court. In
deciding that subsequent creditors; as distinguished from
those creditors whose rights had accrued prior to the ordering of the increase of stock, were entitled to recover, from
the distributees, he uised this language: "It i true they
assume the risk of the stock not being taken at all, but the
moment shares are taken they are supposed to represent so
much money put into the treasury as they are worth, which
becomes available for the payment, not only of future, but
of existing creditors."
He had in a previous portion of the
opinion used this language : " With regard to the first class,
namely, the original stockholders who voted for this increase
of 8oo shares and then distributed among themselves 300
of those shares without the shadow of right or considera- tion, it is difficult to see-why they should not be called itfon
' 139 IT. S., 417.
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to resfiondfor theb- value." Upon this point, therefore, we
are left in the dark as to whether Hawley v. Upton was
followed to the letter, or whether the doctrine was modified.
As to the recipients of the bonus, the Court attempted
a distinction between the taking of stock below par in the
case of "a going concern" and the taking of stock below par
at the inception of a corporation-holding in the latter case
the transaction was a fraud upon creditors, but that in the
former case the subscribers could be held liable for no more
than they had agreed to pay-in this case nothing. The
Upton cases were sought to be distinguished on the ground
that the defendants were original subscribers to the increased
stock or transferrees of such subscribers. The Court seems
to have felt that there was in reality but a shadowy distinction between facilitating the operations of a going concern
by raising money through an increase of stock, and accomplishing the same result by an issue of bonds with a stock
bonis; and perhaps Mr. Justice BROWN (although, as Mr.
THACHER points out, he said the Supreme Court was not
embarrassedby previous decisions upon this point) was himself somewhat embarrassed by the recollection of Flinn v.
Bagley. Accordingly, we find him struggling manfully with
the problem as follows: "The liability of a subscriber for the
par value of increased stock taken by him may depend
somewhat upon the circumstances under which, and the
purposes for which, such increase was made. If it be
merely for the purpose of adding to the original capital
stock of tie corporation and enabling it to do a larger and
more profitable business, such subscriber would stand practically upon the same basis as the subscriber to the original
capital. But we think that an active corporation may, for
the purpose of paying its debts and obtaining money for the
successful prosecution of its business, issue its stock, and
dispose of it for the best price that can be obtained." The
distinction between thfe two transactions, however, was too
fine for the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice LAMAR, who dissented upon this point from the decision of the majority.
This called forth front the pen of Mr. R. C. MCMUR-
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an article entitled, "Is the Capital Stock of a Corporation a Trust. Fund in any Proper Sense?" which
was published by our esteemed contemporary the American Law Review in August, 1891. In that article the
writer took substantially this position (to use the language in which he himself has since summarized it): "No
one can. legally destroy his assets if he does not retain
enough to pay his debts. This applies to corporations as
well as to private persons. Hence settlements on wife and
children can be avoided; and, if the corporation is insolvent, so can contracts by stockholders to pay fifty cents in
TRIE

satisfaction of one dollar. In other words, repbresentations
on which fieofile areasked to rely must be made good in favor
of those who have dealt on the faith of these statements."

He further showed that the distinctive attributes of a trust
fund were wanting in the case of tlhe capital stock of a corporation, whether paid or unpaid; and that the use of the
term was afn abuse of it.
Following closely upon the publication of this article
comes the able opinion of Judge MITCHELL speaking for
the Supreme Court of Minnesota in the case of Hospes v.
Car Co.'
The same learned Judge in delivering the
opinion of the court two years before in the Bank v.
Gustin Mining Co.,2 had recognized certain restrictions upon
the so-called trust fund doctrine, but had admitted that the
general proposition that the capital stock of a corporation
is a trust fund for the benefit of its creditors could not be
controverted.
In Hospes v. Car Co., however, in an
opinion of great vigor, he takes occasion to point out that
" this 'trust fund ' doctrine, commonly called the 'American
doctrine' has given rise to much confusion of ideas as to its
real meaning, and much conflict of decision in its application. To such an extent has this been the case that many
have questioned the accuracy of the phrase as well as
doubted the necessity or expediency of inventing any such
15o N. W. Rep., 1117, 1892.
p. 562.
2 42 Minn., 327.

5 Lewis Amer. R. R. & Corp. Reports,

